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ABSTRACT 
 
I present a spatial model of differentiated product markets in which consumers with 
heterogeneous tastes rationally improve their attitude towards the product they choose. 
Adjustment raises prices if adjustment facility is greater for consumers who initially 
prefer a product more (e.g., preferences and corresponding adjustments exhibit the halo 
effect). It lowers prices if instead easier adjustment for consumers with weaker initial 
preferences causes attitudinal regression to the mean. The theory explains higher 
prices in markets to the poor and less educated and so motivates re-examination of 
previously proposed solutions to the poor performance of those markets. 
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On rare occasions one does hear of a miraculous case of a married couple falling in love 
after marriage, but on close examination it will be found that it is a mere adjustment to 
the inevitable. 
 
- Emma Goldman 
 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 If you are going to do something, you are better off loving it. That is to say, 
individual choice is naturally complemented by the individual’s adjustment to the chosen 
object. Numerous intuitive examples suggest the commonplace nature of adjustment. 
Married couples grow fond of one another over time and more accepting of mutual 
differences. A man who has recently purchased a vacation time-share talks frequently 
about it to his friends, whereby he becomes more excited about it. A woman who, on 
reading an online retailer’s policies, is surprised to learn that in returning an outfit she 
will incur a substantial restocking fee, shrugs and decides she is satisfied with it. A 
consumer gets more out of his smartphone after a few months, having habituated to the 
apps available at his fingertips. 
 Recent behavioural and neural evidence indicates that something measurable is 
occurring in such situations. Across a range of experimental scenarios, individuals have 
been shown routinely to undergo a sort of mental re-positioning relative to choices they 
have made, changing not only their stated preferences, but also physiological 
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manifestations of their hedonic responses.1 The evidence supports a paradigm according 
to which choices not only reflect, but also create, preferences. (Ariely and Norton 2008). 
 In this paper I examine the effects of consumers’ adjustment on the equilibrium in 
differentiated product markets. As I shall discuss in detail below, adjustment matters 
because it affects prices. But the effects are not necessarily what one would intuitively 
expect – namely, that adjustment intensifies preferences and therefore unambiguously 
increases prices. 
 The idea that “tastes change” has been reflected in the recent behavioural 
economic literature on reference dependence; and it has long been accepted in the field of 
psychology, most notably in connection with the framework of cognitive dissonance. The 
former focuses on recognition of the role of the agent’s reference point in his (potentially 
variable) interpretation of and response to outcomes (e.g., Koszegi and Rabin 2006). The 
latter focuses on situations in which mental discord – typically due to an individual 
perceiving a discrepancy between an action he has taken and his preferences, beliefs, or 
identity – provides motivation for a change in mental position to justify the action 
(Festinger 1957). While the work in both areas has been highly influential, these 
literatures do not admit evidence, as in the stories above, that improving one’s “fit” with 
                                                
1 Studies offering evidence of preference change based solely on subject ratings of chosen alternatives 
include Lieberman et al. (2001), Kitayama et al. (2004), Sharot et al. (2010), and Wakslak (2012). Studies 
that additionally measured changes using functional magnetic resource imaging (fMRI) of subjects’ brains 
include Sharot et al. (2009), van Veen et al. (2009), Izuma et al. (2010), Jarcho et al. (2011), Qin et al. 
(2011), Kitayama et al. (2013), and Izuma and Adolphs (2013). 
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a chosen object might be a routine, perhaps optimizing, part of the consumer’s decision 
process.2 
 In traditional economic theory, the consumer problem is generally conceived as 
involving choice under imperfect circumstances, in which options for action do not match 
perfectly with individuals’ preferences. Utility losses due to imperfect matching are 
routinely reflected in the modeling. For example, in Hotelling’s (1929) spatial model of 
differentiated products, consumers experience “transportation costs” when their tastes do 
not align perfectly with their chosen alternative. Given the standard assumption that 
tastes are fixed, consumers’ acceptance of the costs or losses associated with imperfect 
choice (i.e., without adjustment) is posited as optimising behaviour. Rational consumers 
assume moreover that they will not adjust to their choices, whence, the standard model 
predicts, they make choices accordingly.3 If, in reality, consumers do adjust, then both the 
positive and normative implications of the existing models are wrong. Models of 
consumer choice, updated to account for adjustment and for how the adjustment process 
is influenced by relevant market phenomena, could produce superior predictions of both 
behaviour and outcomes. 
                                                
2 Adjustment, as conceived here, has the goal of increasing what Thaler (1985) has termed acquisition 
utility – the net value of what one obtains from a decision. In contrast, reducing cognitive dissonance 
involves increasing Thaler’s transaction utility – one’s perception of the merits of a decision. Different 
goals lead adjustment and dissonance reduction to pursue different strategies: the dissonance-reducing 
agent, for example, reduces the utility associated with non-chosen alternatives, whereas an optimising 
adjuster need not. 
3 In the motivated beliefs literature, agents rationally anticipate that their actions will create corresponding 
beliefs, and their choices reflect this realization (Bodner and Prelec 2003; Benabou and Tirole 2004, 2011; 
Dal Bo and Tervio 2013). However, none of these papers deals with the possibility that actions might create 
preferences. 
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 The paper introduces rational taste change4 into the context of a Hotelling spatial 
model of differentiated product competition. Consumers differ as to their initial tastes for 
two competing products. A consumer can, at a cost, adjust to the product he intends to 
choose – in essence, “moving closer” to it, and thereby avoiding some of the 
transportation cost associated with imperfect taste matching. By incorporating adjustment 
as a step in a model of rational choice, the theory allows the induced outcomes to be 
subsumed into “final” preferences such that the conventional techniques for analysing 
choices, including the axioms of revealed preference, may be applied to them. This 
approach avoids many of the complications associated with previous efforts to model 
taste change. 
 Though adjustment implies intensification of preference, surprisingly prices do 
not rise unambiguously with increasing intensity of consumer adjustment. The direction 
and size of adjustment’s effect on equilibrium market prices depends on how consumers’ 
facility with adjustment varies based on the strength of their initial product preference. 
Adjustment lowers prices if the best opportunities to adjust exist for consumers with 
weaker initial preferences – that is, if final attitudes exhibit regression to the mean. It 
raises prices when adjustment facility is greater for consumers who initially prefer a 
product more – for example, if preferences and corresponding adjustments exhibit the so-
called “halo effect.” 
                                                
4 I characterise adjustment as a process that is fully anticipated by the decision maker, entered into 
consciously, involves the weighing of costs and benefits, and results in outcomes with respect to which the 
decision maker has perfect foresight. I make these characterizations not because there is a preponderance of 
evidence supporting them, but because they constitute the simplest assumptions to make about choice 
behaviour. Rationality offers thus a benchmark that subsequent approaches may modify, relax, or elaborate 
on. 
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 That different patterns of adjustment facility across consumers imply different 
market outcomes has important implications not captured by existing theories of 
competition and consumer behaviour. The paper focuses on the particular cases presented 
by poor and less educated consumers. Traditional accounts blame high search costs and 
sparse retail distribution for the higher prices often found in markets populated by the 
poor and less educated. Thus it is typically predicted that entry by low-cost retailers and 
technological advances such as the Internet and mobile shopping apps will eventually 
resolve inequities. In showing that entrenched patterns of behaviour characterising 
disadvantaged consumers are responsible for the high prices they face, the adjustment 
model recasts the price differentials problem, motivating reconsideration of the validity 
of vaunted solutions and the role for public policy. 
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. 
Section 3 examines the model’s equilibrium. Section 4 focuses on implications of the 
theory. Section 5 concludes and discusses opportunities for future research. The 
Appendix contains proofs of all lemmas and propositions. 
 
2.   A MODEL 
 
 Consider two products, indexed 0 and 1, each produced by an independent firm 
correspondingly named. The firms are located at opposite ends of a segment of length 1 
representing the product space. Following Hotelling’s model (1929), each consumer is 
characterised by a location x ∈ 0,1[ ] , identifying his relative taste for the two products. 
Consumers are assumed distributed on this segment according to an arbitrary distribution 
 6 
function F with full support and continuous density function f. They buy at most one unit 
of a single product. I assume the baseline utility of a consumer at x buying product j to be 
given by 
(1) Ux =V − pj − t x − j   
where V is the common reservation price for the product, pj  is the price of product j, and 
t parameterises the utility loss due to j’s not being the consumer’s ideal choice – the 
standard “transportation” cost, linear in the consumer’s distance from j. 
 Suppose that the consumer faces the possibility of adjusting to a product, defined 
as in effect relocating on the segment to be closer to it, thereby paying less transportation 
cost. The process is quite naturally viewed as an incremental one, involving incremental 
investment of costly or aversive effort that pays off with an incremental improvement in 
attitude toward the product. Consistent with this incremental view, let us posit an 
adjustment marginal cost function associated with product j, g j i, x( ) > 0 , where i is the 
distance from x and closer to j’s position. One may view this function as representing a 
set of adjustment curves  G
j := g j i( ) = g j i, x( ) : x ∈ 0,1[ ]{ }  characterised by differing 
values of x, whereby each curve represents the cost, at each state of attitude improvement 
i, of incremental “movement toward” j for the consumer located initially at x. Let us refer 
to  G
j  as an adjustment map for product j. Figure 1 illustrates an adjustment map for 
product 0. 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
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 For clearer analysis of the effects of adjustment, let us write 
g j i, x,θ( ) = g j i, x( ) +θ , j = 0,1 , where θ ≡ g0 0, 12( ) > 0  is the initial marginal adjustment 
cost with respect to product 0 for a consumer located at x = 12 . θ  serves as a benchmark 
level of adjustment cost, hence an exogenous shifter of g where ∂g
j
∂θ
= 1 . The effects of 
θ  are symmetric across products and consumers; variations in this variable can cleanly 
increase or decrease adjustment intensity. Accordingly, one may think of decreases 
(increases) in θ  as exogenous “increases (decreases) in adjustment.”5 
 Adjustment maps observe the following regularity conditions: 
 
Assumption 1 (Continuity of adjustment cost in x and i). g0 i, x( )  and g1 i, x( )  are 
defined on  0, x[ )× 0,1[ ]→ !
+  and  0,1− x[ )× 0,1[ ]→ !
+ , respectively, and continuous 
on their support. 
 
Assumption 2 (Convexity of adjustment curves). gij > 0  and giij > 0 , for j = 0,1 . 
 
Assumption 3 (Preference dominance). For all x ∈ 0,1[ ] , − ∂g0∂x < ∂g
0
∂i  (and 
∂g1
∂x <
∂g1
∂i ). 
 
The last of these specifies in effect that the more preferred a product is initially, the lower 
the marginal cost of adjustment at any particular location achieved through accumulated 
                                                
5 To keep notation simple, I will generally write g j i, x( ) , suppressing the argument θ , except where 
relevant to a particular part of the analysis. 
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adjustment. This “dominance” condition implies that an individual who initially prefers a 
product more than another individual finds it less costly to achieve a given attitude 
toward that product through adjustment than the other individual. The condition gives 
rise to adjustment maps of non-crossing nested contours, similar to well-behaved 
indifference maps. It follows that adjustment results in greater achieved attitude the 
greater the individual’s initial proximity to a product. 
 Extending Assumption 2, assume that adjusting to the point where a product is 
viewed as ideal is infinitely costly. Thus, while someone might get quite comfortable 
with a product at finite cost, one cannot get perfectly comfortable. I adopt this because it 
is sensible, does not meaningfully sacrifice generality, and avoids corner cases: 
 
Assumption 4 (Asymptotic adjustment). lim
i→x
g0 i, x( ) = ∞  (and lim
i→1−x
g1 i, x( ) = ∞ ). 
 
 For consumers for whom adjustment is preferred with respect to a given product 
relative to leaving one’s attitude fixed, it is possible to define the notion of adjustment 
productivity: how much attitude improvement with respect to the product the consumer 
will attain, given his preferences, his particular capabilities at adjusting to it, and the 
transportation cost (i.e., his opportunity cost of adjusting). Define the set 
Xj t( ) := x :g j 0, x( ) < t{ } ; since g j 0, x( ) , while continuous, is not required to be 
monotonic in x, Xj t( )  may contain (compact) gaps. One may then define the implicit 
function i* j x,t( )  on  Xj t( )× t > 0{ }→ !
+  such that g j i* j x,t( ), x( ) = t  as consumer x’s 
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“adjustment productivity given t.” Note that, for x ∉Xj t( ) , i* j x,t( ) = 0 . Thus the 
adjustment model nests non-adjustment as a sub-case (i.e., Xj t( ) = φ ). 
 The following lemma advances some useful results that follow from the definition 
of adjustment productivity: 
 
Lemma 1. (i) ix*0 <1 (and ix*1 > −1); (ii) it*0 = −iθ*0 = 1 gi*00 > 0  (and it*1 = −iθ*1 = 1 gi*11 > 0 ). 
 
 Accounting for adjustment, the utility of a consumer at x buying product 0 is 
given by 
(2) U0 =V − p0 − t x − i*0 x,t( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g0 i, x( )di
0
i*0 x,t( )
∫   
and, for a consumer at x buying product 1, by 
(3) U1 =V − p1 − t 1− x − i*1 x,t( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g1 i, x( )di
0
i*1 x,t( )
∫   
One can see that utility losses accruing to choosing a non-ideal product equal the sum of 
adjustment cost and transportation cost components and are a function of the consumer’s 
adjustment productivity. Figure 2 displays these losses graphically as areas under the 
adjustment and transportation cost curves.6 
< INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
                                                
6 Note that the setup in (2) and (3) is isomorphic to a traditional Hotelling model with nonlinear 
transportation costs. The rationale for layering adjustment into the model explicitly (i.e., by means of the 
“adjustment map”) is so that its effects may be seen distinctly. 
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 Following Bloch and Manceau (1999), but extended to the adjustment case, I 
impose what is in effect a restriction on the size of V relative to t and to the rate of change 
of g0  with respect to x: 
 
Assumption 5. V − t x − i*0 x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g0 i, x( )di
0
i*0 x( )
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
F x( )  is increasing for all x ∈ 0,1[ ] . 
 
The assumption is a sufficient condition for the market to be covered under adjustment: 
 
Lemma 2. Given Assumption 5, the market is covered in equilibrium. 
 
 The location xE*  of the indifferent consumer under adjustment can be derived by 
setting U0 =U1 . Thus it is defined implicitly by` 
(4) 
Θ xE* ,t, p0, p1( ) ≡ p1 − p0 + t − 2txE* − t i*1 xE* ,t( )− i*0 xE* ,t( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
+ g1 i, xE*( )di
0
i*1 xE* ,t( )
∫ − g0 i, xE*( )di
0
i*0 xE* ,t( )
∫ = 0
  
Based on this, market shares for the two products are defined by D0 = F xE*( )  and 
D1 = 1− F xE*( ) . 
 There are two periods. In the first, firms choose prices, taking each other’s prices 
as given. In the second, consumers choose products and adjust to the product they 
choose; they receive utility, and the firms earn profits. The equilibrium concept used for 
evaluating the game is subgame perfect Nash. 
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 Given demand, profits of the firms are given by 
(5) Π0 = p0F xE*( )       Π1 = p1 1− F xE*( ){ }   
 As a final assumption, I employ a variant on a distributional restriction by Caplin 
and Nalebuff (1991), which they showed constitutes a sufficient condition for the 
existence of a unique equilibrium in a broad class of games. Bloch and Manceau (1999) 
demonstrated the use of the Caplin-Nalebuff assumption in a Hotelling model of product 
differentiation with a generic distribution of consumers. The present variant generalises 
that assumption to the model involving adjustment by imposing a set of complementary 
restrictions on the consumer distribution f and the adjustment functions g j . In the 
Appendix, it is demonstrated that the assumption applies to a rather general set of f and g 
functional form combinations. 
 
Assumption 6. F .( )  is log concave in p0  (and 1− F .( )  is log concave in p1 ). 
 
3.   EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 We focus on firm 0’s problem. Differentiating firm 0’s profit equation in (5) with 
respect to price yields 
(6) ∂Π0
∂p0
= F xE*( ) + p0 f xE*( ) ∂xE
*
∂p0
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where ∂xE* ∂p0 is derived by applying Cramer’s rule to (4),7 
(7) ∂xE
*
∂p0
= − ∂xE
*
∂p1
= 1
−2t + dg
1
dxE*
di
0
i*1 xE* ,t( )
∫ − dg
0
dxE*
di
0
i*0 xE* ,t( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
< 0   
 Using (6), one obtains ∂Π0 ∂p0( ) p0=0 = F xE
*( ) p0=0 > 0 : non-zero demand for 
product 0 is guaranteed at p0 = 0  by t > 0  and g j i, x( ) > 0 . Moreover, 
∂Π0 ∂p0( ) p0 xE* =0 = p0 f 0( ) ∂xE
* ∂p0( ) < 0 , where p0 xE* =0 > 0 . Because, following from 
Assumption 6, −F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0  must be decreasing in p0 , it follows that: 
 
Proposition 1. There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices p0*, p1*( )  
where the prices are given by p0* = −F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0  and p1* = 1− F xE*( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f xE*( ) ∂xE
*
∂ p1 .
8 
 
 In the context of the unique price equilibrium one may draw conclusions about 
the effects of adjustment on the price sensitivity of demand and, ultimately, prices. 
Consider a case in which adjustment and demand are symmetric across products so that 
any influence of adjustment on relative demand is eliminated and we may focus on non-
                                                
7 As a notational simplification, I write throughout dg
j
dxE*
 for dg
j
dx i, xE*( )  and d2g jdxE*2  for d
2g j
dx2 i, xE*( ) , the first 
and second derivatives of g j  with respect to x evaluated at xE* . 
8 This represents essentially the extension of Bloch and Manceau’s (1999) Proposition 2 to the adjustment 
case. 
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sectoral effects. Focusing on product 0, recognizing that D0 = F xE*( )  and using (7), one 
obtains 
(8) ∂D0
∂p0
=
f xE*( )
−2t + dg
1
dxE*
di
0
i*1 xE* ,t( )
∫ − dg
0
dxE*
di
0
i*0 xE* ,t( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
  
Differentiation with respect to θ  leads to the following result: 
 
Proposition 2. Consider a symmetric case in adjustment. Adjustment increases the price 
sensitivity of product demands when consumers’ adjustment facility diminishes with 
stronger initial product preference. It decreases the price sensitivity of demands when 
consumers’ adjustment facility increases with stronger initial product preference. 
 
 Proposition 2 provides our first glimpse into the forces that govern competitive 
equilibrium under adjustment. General intuition can be drawn from (8), which reduces to 
the constant − f xE
*( )
2t  in the no-adjustment, traditional Hotelling case (i.e., with i* j = 0 ). 
The nature of the departure of (8) from that case can be seen to depend on the signed rate 
at which marginal adjustment costs for each product change with the indifferent 
consumer’s position xE* , moderated by the indifferent consumer’s adjustment 
productivity with respect to the corresponding product. The expression makes evident 
what we find in the formal result: greater adjustment intensity enables increased 
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expression of price sensitivity effects that depend on how adjustment facility varies with 
strength of initial product preference. 
 Consider Figure 3. The first panel of the figure shows a symmetric adjustment 
map in which the curves grow steeper as as one moves from xE*  toward positions of 
stronger initial preference. The second panel shows a symmetric map in which the curves 
at first grow flatter. In both cases, the curves must eventually become increasingly steep 
as one approaches x = 0  or x = 1; this follows from Assumption 4. What is critical to our 
result, however, is what happens near xE* . If the curves grow steeper with stronger initial 
preference, a price increase for a product moves to the margin previously-inframarginal 
consumers who find adjustment less productive at improving their attitude than the 
consumer at xE* . These consumers, if they switched products, would forgo higher total 
costs (i.e., transportation plus adjustment costs) from the product they left than would a 
consumer with the same adjustment facility as the consumer at xE* . Given symmetry, 
they would also incur lower total costs from their new product relative to a consumer 
with the same adjustment facility as the consumer at xE* . Thus an adjustment map with 
this particular shape sets up an increased incentive for switching, whence demand is more 
price-sensitive, all else equal. The more intensively consumers engage in adjustment, the 
more relative adjustment facility conditions consumers’ decisions, and so the stronger the 
described effect. 
< INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
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 Consider, on the other hand, what occurs when the adjustment map has the shape 
displayed in the second panel of the figure. Then, a price increase moves to the margin 
previously-inframarginal consumers who find adjustment more productive than the 
consumer at xE* . These consumers, if they switched products, would forgo lower total 
costs from the product they left than would a consumer with the same adjustment facility 
as the consumer at xE* . Given symmetry, they would also incur higher total costs from 
their new product relative to a consumer with the same adjustment facility as the 
consumer at xE* . Thus demand is less price sensitive, all else equal, when the adjustment 
map has this particular shape. As with the steepening map, the more intensively 
consumers engage in adjustment, the stronger the described effect. 
 The implications of adjustment for price levels follow directly from Proposition 2, 
in view of the price equations given in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 3. Consider a symmetric case in adjustment. Adjustment decreases prices 
when consumers’ adjustment facility diminishes with stronger initial product preference. 
It increases prices when consumers’ adjustment facility increases with stronger initial 
product preference. 
 
As with Proposition 2, Proposition 3’s intuition has to do with switching. Because price 
increases encourage more rapid switching when adjustment maps steepen, firms naturally 
find it less profitable to increase prices under such circumstances. The opposite is true 
when adjustment maps flatten toward the extremes. Adjustment intensity, which 
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conditions the relative size of the role adjustment costs play in consumers’ decisions, 
determines the degree to which the variation of adjustment facility with strength of initial 
preference influences firms’ decisions over price. 
 Note that the effects of adjustment behaviour on price sensitivity and price levels 
that we have just derived offer quite a general result. They do not depend on the 
distribution of consumers: the model has posited a general distribution function. They 
depend only how the progression of marginal adjustment costs of consumers over the 
adjustment process varies depending upon the relative strength of their initial preferences, 
as represented by the shape of the adjustment map. 
 Finally, let us generalise to the adjustment case the classic Hotelling result on the 
price effect of product differentiation: 
 
Proposition 4 (Product differentiation). Consider a symmetric case with respect to the 
two firms. (i) Prices increase with t. (ii) The effect of t on prices is less (greater) relative 
to the no-adjustment case when consumers’ adjustment facility decreases (increases) with 
stronger initial product preference. (iii) t intensifies the effects of adjustment on price. 
 
An increment to t increases the market power of the firms directly, as in the classic 
model; additionally it increases the importance of consumer adjustment, causing the price 
effects of adjustment to be more pronounced. Thus, if adjustment curves become steeper 
as one moves toward positions of extreme preference, an increase in product 
differentiation causes prices to rise more slowly than they would in the no-adjustment 
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case, due to the offsetting effects of the expressed adjustment. If adjustment curves 
become flatter toward the extremes, an increase in product differentiation causes prices to 
rise faster than they would in the no-adjustment case, for the same reason. In all cases the 
sign of the effect of product differentiation on prices remains unambiguously positive. 
 
4.   IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
 
4.1.   Two adjustment regimes: regression to the mean and the halo effect 
 
 What do the patterns of marginal adjustment cost represented by the maps shown 
in the two panels of Figure 3 signify in terms of real-world behaviour? When should one 
expect adjustment behaviour to be characterised by pattern in the top panel, and when the 
pattern in the bottom panel? 
 One may think of adjustment quite generally as drawing upon current experiences 
and exposures to information, as well as the data from past exposures stored in memory, 
as resources for attitude change (Crano and Prislin 2006). Consider first a simple case in 
which individuals have no innate differences in attitudes or abilities to adjust, and in 
which ability to adjust and exposure to information supportive to attitude are uncorrelated 
with current attitude. In such a case an individual’s stronger (weaker) initial positive 
attitude toward an object must accrue to having received prior positive (negative) 
exposures in support of that attitude. How easy further adjustment will be for an 
individual will depend on which exposures have already occurred – in essence, draws 
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without replacement – versus which have not. Thus those individuals with a weak initial9 
preference for an object should possess the greatest pool of not-previously-drawn positive 
exposures, representing the greatest unexploited opportunities to adjust. Meanwhile, 
those with the most intense initial preferences will have exhausted (i.e., drawn without 
replacement) the most persuasive information and arguments available to foster 
adjustment. It follows in this scenario that individuals with weaker initial preferences will 
find adjustment less costly, while those with stronger initial preferences will find it more 
costly. Consistent with the top panel of Figure 3, such an adjustment cost structure would 
be characterised by attitudes tending to converge following adjustment. I refer to this as 
the regression to the mean (RTTM) regime. 
 Now consider a case in which individuals may or may not exhibit innate 
differences in attitude toward an object, but where the ability to adjust and/or exposure to 
information supportive to attitude correlate with one’s currently having a strong positive 
attitude. This would logically follow if, say, judgments or information availability in 
memory are biased in the direction of one’s current attitude. In this case individuals 
would find adjustment easier the stronger their initial preferences. Thus a strong positive 
initial impression of an object would correlate with the building of yet a stronger positive 
attitude, consistent with the bottom panel in Figure 3. A well-documented phenomenon 
that epitomises this is the halo effect, according to which individuals infer unknown 
qualities of an object based on their existing overall impressions.10 
                                                
9 Since attitude change may quite generally be viewed as occurring dynamically over the whole life of the 
individual, the term “initial” should be interpreted as relative to the point in time at which a consumer 
decision is imminent, whence motivated decision-complementary adjustment would commence. 
10 See, e.g., Nisbett and Wilson (1977). 
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 The characteristic that distinguishes RTTM adjustment from halo effect 
adjustment is the scope of the information and persuasive arguments that individuals rely 
upon under each. Specifically, the biasing that affects halo effect adjusters is tantamount 
to a constraint on the scope of information relied upon. To see this intuitively, consider 
that in Figure 3 it is possible to convert any set of symmetric adjustment maps based on 
the bottom pattern to a set observing the top pattern simply by lowering the more extreme 
portions of the inner adjustment curves and thereby reducing their slopes. Thus one may 
think of the halo effect pattern, quite generally, as reflecting a failure of relatively 
indifferent individuals to “see” opportunities for more facile adjustment that those who 
already strongly prefer the object see. In effect, halo effect adjusters with initial weak 
impressions exhibit a kind of myopia. 
 What observable factors can explain this tendency toward constrained information 
sourcing? While others may be possible, I propose two accounts that point to answers to 
this question. One possibility, supported by evidence from psychological research, is that 
the halo effect adjusters are going with their initial impressions because their cognitive 
resources are limited and it is simply easier to do so than to come up with new 
information or arguments that go beyond those impressions.11 Another possibility is that 
these individuals intrinsically prefer to draw information from their initial impressions. 
This might occur if individuals have preferences not just over goods and services, but 
over information sources for making judgments regarding goods and services. Such a 
preference might induce an individual to rely on initial impressions heavily, even if doing 
                                                
11 See Kahneman (2011), Chapter 7; and, for a classic application to how people assess others’ 
personalities, Asch (1946). 
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so reduces his eventual consumption utility from the goods or services. The remainder of 
this section considers some observable factors that explain halo effect adjustment 
behaviour as a function either of individual cognitive resource limitations or intrinsic 
preference for initial impressions. 
 
4.2.   Markets to the poor 
 
 Recent research suggests that the poor experience challenges not only because of 
their limited financial resources, but also because of severely taxed resources of attention. 
Overwhelmed by the need to address pressing demands presented by overdue bills, 
unreliable child care, debts and the like, they find their attention compromised with 
respect to anything that is not immediately pressing. Diverse studies find that 
“bandwidth” constraints lead poor people to exhibit reduced fluid intelligence, working 
memory, and executive control (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). In the context of the 
adjustment model, a bandwidth tax implies yet another challenge: those in poverty adjust 
to products based on the halo effect pattern and therefore, all else equal, pay higher prices 
than other people. 
 Bandwidth constraints imply that adjustment, which requires bandwidth, would 
be a luxury for the poor. More important for our purposes, however, the pattern of 
marginal adjustment costs faced by the poor is likely to be qualitatively altered by those 
constraints. Consistent with their tendency to attend primarily to what is immediately in 
front of them, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the poor would draw heavily on their 
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own initial impressions, rather than diverse external resources, when adjusting. 
Considering new persuasive arguments and new sources of information in support of a 
product – in essence, “getting the big picture” – is beyond the wherewithal of someone 
who is continually thinking about when her next paycheck is coming and how to allocate 
it among various urgent needs. A poor individual who is relatively indifferent to a 
product will, therefore, find it exceedingly hard to get more comfortable with that 
product. Put another way, myopia with respect to the good qualities of an indifferent 
object is particularly acute for those in poverty: it is hard, given taxed bandwidth, to see 
what is so good about a thing you had not previously considered carefully. 
 Whether the poor pay more for equivalent items than other people has long been 
debated in the literature. Conceptually there are factors that cut both ways. On the one 
hand, the poor face limited access to low-price outlets within their own neighborhoods, 
combined with mobility constraints that make it difficult for them to benefit from the 
greater array of distribution options available in wealthier areas. (Eckholm 2006, 
Fellowes 2006, Talukdar 2008.) On the other hand, financial scarcity motivates the poor 
to be more parsimonious and devote more effort to economizing relative to other people 
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013, pp. 87-104). Additionally, a lower opportunity cost of 
time may induce the poor to invest more hours in the search process (Talukdar 2008). 
Evidence on the question is correspondingly mixed. Several studies indicate the poor pay 
higher prices, mainly because they make a substantial portion of their purchases at 
smaller, non-chain-based, higher-priced stores (Chung and Myers 1999, Prahalad and 
Hammond 2002, Talukdar 2008). Meanwhile, Borda et al. (2009) find in an extensive 
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study using Neilsen household-level data that, while the poor indeed make a substantial 
portion of their purchases at convenience stores, they buy so much more at low-priced 
superstores that they end up paying less on average. The authors of the study find, 
moreover, that the poor pay less on average at the same outlets than other people, because 
they are more likely to buy items on sale. Their findings corroborate the proposition that 
the poor are more motivated to save and so are more parsimonious than other people. 
 Critically, the focal conversation in the existing literature has to do with search 
and supply; that is, whether the poor’s benefits and costs of search, and their access to 
low-priced goods, differ significantly on balance from everyone else’s. On this basis, if in 
fact the poor pay more, it would be tempting to speculate that market forces, in time, will 
bring down prices for those in poverty. To the extent that the poor have traditionally had 
to abide high-priced convenience stores associated with so-called “food deserts” (i.e., 
neighborhoods bereft of supermarkets), inroads from superstores such as Wal-Mart 
would be expected to narrow price disparities. Solutions based on new technologies, such 
as online shopping and mobile apps that allow for store-to-store price comparisons 
without the need to travel, would bring down search costs and help close the price gap. 
 But predictions such as these ignore the cognitive dimension of the problem the 
poor face. The adjustment theory demonstrates that high search costs and sparse supply 
are not the only disadvantages suffered by the poor in goods markets. Correspondingly, 
innovations that have reduced search costs and improved supply over the past generation 
and that continue to make improvements in these areas are not a panacea for those in 
poverty. 
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 To eliminate the disadvantages of the poor, one must go to the heart of the 
problem: their deficit of bandwidth. Many of the policy suggestions advanced by 
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) aimed at clearing bandwidth for the poor could help 
improve their plight in goods markets. Note that, per the discussion above, the bandwidth 
deficit poses a problem for the poor not because of its direct effect on the decision 
processing capabilities of the individual consumer. Rather it is for the counterintuitive 
reason that this deficit influences the way in which adjustment capabilities are distributed 
across the mass of consumers based on relative strength of preference. This bears 
emphasis, because it is normal for one to think of prices being kept low by the vigilance 
and good judgment of individual consumers. Corresponding to the ecological nature of 
the problem, the benefits of bandwidth-clearing policies flow from a beneficial change to 
the distribution of relative adjustment capabilities rather than – as would seem most 
intuitive – from impacts on the quality of individual decisions. 
 
4.3.   Other constrained individuals 
 
 The poor are not the only group characterised by the sort of cognitive tax that 
results in halo effect adjustment. Anyone whose cognitive resources are severely taxed 
should experience the adjustment myopia hypothesised. People under substantial stress, 
for example, will tend to “tunnel,” paying attention only to immediately pressing matters 
and ignoring opportunities for gain that are not immediately in front of them. People who 
are extremely busy, or who are highly focused on other forms of scarcity, such as 
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loneliness, may behave similarly.12 When markets are dominated by such individuals, the 
predicted price and price sensitivity effects corresponding to halo effect adjustment 
should appear. The greater the proportion of taxed individuals present in the market, the 
stronger the effects. 
 
4.4.   Markets to the less educated 
 
 The adjustment theory also admits the provocative conclusion that personality 
affects market outcomes. Openness to experience, one of the dimensions in the Five-
Factor Model of personality, characterises individuals who exhibit an intrinsic interest in 
a variety of experiences and a “fluid style of consciousness” (McRae 2004). An 
individual with this personality type would be unusually capable at getting comfortable 
with objects with respect to which he had not previously formed a strong positive 
impression (e.g., new or previously untried products). The implication is that a market 
dominated by individuals rating highly on openness to experience should be epitomised 
by the RTTM adjustment pattern and should tend to have lower prices. Meanwhile, a 
market largely consisting of people less open to experience might tend toward the halo 
effect pattern and have higher prices. 
 The degree of openness may explain price patterns typically attributed to other 
factors. As a trait that has been related to intelligence and knowledge (Wiggins 1996), its 
absence may explain the higher prices often paid by less educated individuals (e.g., 
                                                
12 For an extensive taxonomy of groups that exhibit intense cognitive scarcity, see Mullainathan and Shafir 
(2013). 
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Hausman and Sidak 2004). The traditional explanation of why the less educated pay more 
has focused on lack of facility with search: those with fewer years of schooling find 
information processing more challenging and so should be expected to have a harder time 
getting the best product deals (Schmidt and Spreng 1996). But a policy based on the logic 
of search costs, such as training in consumer skills, would fail to address the personality 
effect. That is, the less educated, even when trained thus, would likely remain more 
dogmatic and less tolerant of ambiguity, hence less receptive to new things (McRae 
2004). Markets dominated by the less educated accordingly could exhibit persistently 
high prices even when individuals are treated with targeted consumer education. 
 Increasing competition has been proposed as an alternative way of addressing the 
high prices paid by the less educated (Hausman and Sidak 2004). In the adjustment 
model, increased competition manifests as lower transportation costs, which lead to lower 
prices. Proposition 4 indicates that markets exhibiting the halo effect pattern are more 
sensitive to variation in transportation costs, all else equal. There is reason, therefore, to 
believe that increased competition would indeed be an effective remedy for markets 
dominated by less educated individuals. 
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper has presented a new theory of differentiated product markets in which 
attitude adjustment complements consumer choice. I have laid out a model whose core 
construct – the adjustment map – provides a general setup for analysing how differences 
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in the distribution of adjustment capabilities across consumers endowed with different 
initial preferences lead to different market outcomes. The theory provides specific 
predictions for markets dominated by poor consumers, other cognitively taxed 
consumers, and less educated consumers. These cases offer but a few illustrations of the 
competitive market effects that follow from this behavioural phenomenon. The economic 
relevance of adjustment goes beyond its effects on prices in a competitive market to areas 
yet to be considered. 
 The process of understanding the implications of consumer adjustment has thus 
only been initiated, and there are a number of useful directions for further research. Let 
me suggest two in closing. Taking the theory to data either in the lab or by an appropriate 
field experiment could offer a proof of concept and allow measurement of the model’s 
predicted effects. An ideal study would quantify the size of effects predicted on the basis 
of adjustment relative to factors traditionally recognised as affecting price levels. The 
role of product differentiation as a mediating factor could be explicitly examined. 
 Additionally, the recognition that complementary adjustment is an element of the 
consumer decision process naturally motivates a re-examination of the role of 
advertising. Several studies suggest that it may be appropriate to think of advertising as 
facilitating consumer self-persuasion.13 Within the adjustment theory’s framework, 
advertising might be contextualised as reducing – and, more generally, restructuring – the 
                                                
13 See Ehrlich et al. (1957) and Mills (1965) for evidence of consumers’ use of advertising to reduce the 
cognitive dissonance experienced following a purchase. The motivated use of advertising by consumers is 
discussed conceptually in the uses and gratifications literature: see O’Donohoe (1994), Ko et al. (2005), 
Aitken et al. (2008), and Phillips and McQuarrie (2010). 
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costs of adjustment. By means of the framework, a future analysis might effectively take 
a fresh look at advertising’s effects on competitive market equilibrium and welfare. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A.   APPLICABILITY OF LOG CONCAVITY OF F .( )  IN pj   
 In this section, I show that log concavity of F .( )  in p0  – a critical condition for 
the existence of an interior equilibrium in prices – may be met (1) for the general class of 
symmetric adjustment map pairs for any symmetric distribution f, and (2) for an example 
of a non-symmetric adjustment map pair when f is Beta distributed with shape parameters 
α ,β( ) = 3,3( ) . The main issue in the case of non-symmetric map pairs is that, 
approaching the extreme locations x = 0  and x = 1 , consumers’ marginal adjustment 
costs approach infinity for the nearby product. Thus, unless marginal adjustment costs for 
the distant product similarly grow without limit, sensitivity of demand to price rises 
precipitously at the extremes, making it potentially profitable for firms to attempt to drop 
price from any candidate interior maximum to a low enough level to take the whole 
market. This situation is avoided if the density of consumers at the extremes is 
sufficiently low, as with some log-concave distributions such as the Beta. So, to 
summarise, an interior price equilibrium will result whenever the incentive to de-stabilise 
such an equilibrium is mitigated by adjustment symmetry; or when there are not enough 
consumers with extreme tastes for firms to want to de-stabilize an interior price 
equilibrium despite non-symmetry. 
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 We may define the log concavity of F .( )  in p0  as f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0 F xE*( )  being 
decreasing in p0  or, equivalently, −F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0  decreasing in p0 . This gives rise to 
the following necessary and sufficient condition: 
(A1) 
∂2 xE*
∂ p02
∂xE*
∂ p0( )2
<
f xE*( )
F xE*( )
−
f ' xE*( )
f xE*( )
  
Using (7), 
 
∂2 xE*
∂p02
= − −2t + dg
1
dxE*
di
0
i*1 xE*( )
∫ −
dg0
dxE*
di
0
i*0 xE*( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
−2
⋅
d 2g1
dxE*2
∂xE*
∂p0
di
0
i*1 xE*( )
∫ −
d 2g0
dxE*2
∂xE*
∂p0
di + dg
1
dxE*
ix*1
∂xE*
∂p0
− dg
0
dxE*
ix*0
∂xE*
∂p00
i*0 xE*( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
= − ∂xE
*
∂p0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2 d 2g1
dxE*2
∂xE*
∂p0
di
0
i*1 xE*( )
∫ −
d 2g0
dxE*2
∂xE*
∂p0
di + dg
1
dxE*
ix*1
∂xE*
∂p0
− dg
0
dxE*
ix*0
∂xE*
∂p00
i*0 xE*( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
  
whence (A1) may be re-written 
(A2) − ∂xE
*
∂ p0
d 2g1
dxE*2
di
0
i*1 xE*( )
∫ −
d 2g0
dxE*2
di + dg
1
dxE*
ix*1 −
dg0
dxE*
ix*0
0
i*0 xE*( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
<
f xE*( )
F xE*( )
−
f ' xE*( )
f xE*( )
  
where ∂xE
*
∂ p0 , which is not a function of i, has been pulled out of the integrals. 
 Consider first the set of pairs of symmetric adjustment maps,  G
0,G 1{ } . For each 
adjustment curve in  G
0  corresponding to a given location x ∈ 0,1( ) , the corresponding 
curve in  G
1  would be its mirror image about x. An example of a subset of such pairs, for 
j = 0,1  and ρ ∈ −1,1[ ] , is given by 
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(A3) g j =
x
2 x−i( )                    for x ∈ 0, 14[ ]
ρx
2 x−i( ) +
1−ρ
2−8i           for x ∈ 14 , 12[ ]
ρ 1−x( )
2 1−x−i( ) +
1−ρ
2−8i         for x ∈ 12 , 34[ ]
1−x
2 1−x−i( )                  for x ∈ 34 ,1[ ]
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
  
Map pairs corresponding to the values ρ = 1  and ρ = −1  are shown in Figure 4. 
<INSERT FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 
 With symmetric adjustment map pairs, and symmetric distribution f, the following 
conditions hold: (i) dg
0
dxE*
= dg
1
dxE*
, (ii) d
2g0
dxE*2
= d
2g1
dxE*2
, (iii) i*0 = i*1 , (iv) ix*0 = ix*1 , and (v) 
f ' xE*( ) = 0 . It may be verified, based on these, that the necessary and sufficient condition 
(A2) above for log concavity is met, whence log concavity of F x p0( )( )  holds for any 
symmetric distribution f. 
 Consider now an example of a non-symmetric adjustment map pair, given by
g0 i, x( ) ≡ x 2 x − i( )  and g1 i, x( ) ≡ 1− x( ) 2 1− x − i( )  for x ∈ 0,1[ ] . These functions have 
the property that g0 0, x( ) = g1 0, x( ) = 1 2 . Observe further that i*0 x,t( ) = 2t−12t x  is defined 
for t ≥ 12 , whence i* < x ; similarly i*1 x,t( ) = 2t−12t 1− x( ) , whence i* <1− x . We also have 
ix*0 = 2t−12t  and ix*1 = − 2t−12t . We evaluate the left-hand side of (A2) at i = 0  (i.e., the position 
at which the indifferent consumer evaluates his decision between product options) for all 
x ∈ 0,1[ ] , using integration by parts: 
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(A4)
d 2g1
dxE*2
di
0
i*1 xE*( )
∫ −
d 2g0
dxE*2
di + dg
1
dxE*
ix*1 −
dg0
dxE*
ix*0
0
i*0 xE*( )
∫
= i1− x − i( )30
2t−1
2t 1−x( )
∫ di −
i
x − i( )3
di + i2 1− x − i( )2
− 2t −12t
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ −
−i
2 x − i( )2
2t −1
2t
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟0
2t−1
2t x
∫
= i2 1− x − i( )2
− 12 1− x − i( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
0
2t−1
2t 1−x( )
− i2 x − i( )2
− 12 x − i( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
0
2t−1
2t x
=
4t 2 − 4t +1( ) 2x −1( )
2x 1− x( )
 
where 
 ∂g
0
∂x =
−i
2 x − i( )2
≤ 0 ; ∂
2g0
∂x2 =
i
x − i( )3
≥ 0   
and 
 ∂g
1
∂x =
i
2 1− x − i( )2
≥ 0 ; ∂
2g1
∂x2 =
i
1− x − i( )3
≥ 0   
 
Substituting into (7) for our example functions we obtain ∂xE
*
∂ p0 = −1 1− ln 12t( ) , whence we 
may re-write the left-hand side of (A2) as  
(A5) − ∂xE
*
∂ p0
d 2g1
dxE*2
di
0
i*1 xE*( )
∫ −
d 2g0
dxE*2
di + dg
1
dxE*
ix*1 −
dg0
dxE*
ix*0
0
i*0 xE*( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
=
4t 2 − 4t +1( ) 2x −1( )
2x 1− x( ) 1− ln 12t( )
  
 Now assume f is distributed Beta with shape parameters α ,β( ) = 3,3( ) . We have: 
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f x( ) = x 1− x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
u 1− u( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 du
0
1
∫
;  F x( ) =
u 1− u( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 du
0
x
∫
u 1− u( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 du
0
1
∫
⇒ f ' x( ) = 2x 1− x( ) 1− 2x( )
u 1− u( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 du
0
1
∫
  
Thus, 
(A6) 
f ' xE*( )
f xE*( )
−
f xE*( )
F xE*( )
=
2x 1− x( ) 1− 2x( )
x 1− x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 −
x 1− x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
u 1− u( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 du
0
x
∫
=
2 1− 2x( )
x 1− x( ) −
30 1− x[ ]2
x 6x2 −15x +10⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
  
One may verify using (A5) and (A6) that (A2) holds for all x ∈ 0,1( ) , and for any t > 12 . 
 
B.  PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS OF LEMMAS, PROPOSITIONS, AND REMARKS 
 
Derivation of Lemma 1.  Beginning with the expression g j i* j x,t,θ( ),θ , x( ) = t  which 
implicitly defines i* j , and totally differentiating (here, for j = 0 ), 
 gi*0
0 di*0 = −gx0dx − gθ0dθ + dt⇔ gi*0
0 di*0 = −gx0dx − dθ + dt   
Using Cramer’s rule, it follows from Assumption 3 that 
 ix*0 x,A0( ) = − gx
0
gi*0
0 <
gi*0
0
gi*0
0 = 1   
Also using Cramer’s rule one obtains 
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 it*0 x,A0r,t( ) = 1 gi*00 > 0  and iθ*0 = −
gθ0
gi*0
0 = −
1
gi*0
0 < 0  
Corresponding results can be derived along the same lines for j = 1 . 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is an extension of the proof of Bloch and Manceau’s 
(1999) Lemma 1. Suppose that the market is not covered, that is, at equilibrium prices 
p0*, p1*( )  there exists a consumer x for whom 
 
V − p0* − t x − i*0 x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g0 i, x( )di
0
i*0 x( )
∫ < 0    and 
V − p1* − t 1− x − i*1 x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g1 i, x( )di
0
i*1 x( )
∫ < 0
 
One can show these prices do not constitute a Nash equilibrium, in that firm 0 can 
increase its profit by lowering its price p0  without altering the profit, hence strategy, of 
firm 1. Begin by noting that, under p0*, p1*( ) , because there is a consumer for whom 
neither good provides nonnegative utility somewhere between the firms, the profit of firm 
0 can be written 
 Π0 = p0* x0( )F x0( ) ≡ V − t x0 − i*0 x0( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g0 i, x0( )di
0
i*0 x0( )
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
F x0( )   
where x0  is the position of the consumer who, at prices p0*, p1*( ) , is just indifferent 
between buying product 0 and buying nothing. By assumption, ∂Π0 ∂x0 > 0 . Now note 
that  
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∂p0 ∂x0 = −t + tix*0 − g0 i*0, x0( )ix*0 − dg
0
dx0
di
0
i*0 x0( )
∫
= −t − dg
0
dx0
di
0
i*0 x0( )
∫ < −t +
dg0
di di0
i*0 x0( )
∫
= −t + g i*0 x0( ), x0( )− g 0, x0( ) = −g 0, x0( ) < 0
 
which follows from Assumption 3. Since ∂Π0 ∂x0 = ∂Π0 ∂p0( ) ∂p0 ∂x0( ) , it follows 
that ∂Π0 ∂p0 < 0 . Therefore a small downward deviation in the price p0  from p0*  
increases firm 0’s profits while not affecting firm 1’s profits. This contradicts the 
assertion that p0*, p1*( )  constitute an equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating (8) with respect to θ  yields 
 
∂2D0
∂p0 ∂θ
= −
f xE*( )
−2t + dg
1
dxE*
di
0
i*1 xE* ,A1( )
∫ − dg
0
dxE*
di
0
i*0 xE* ,A0( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
2
⋅
dg1
dxE*
iθ*1 + ix*1
∂xE*
dθ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ ∂
2g1
∂xE* ∂θ
+ d
2g1
dx2
∂xE*
dθ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
di
0
i*1 xE* ,A1( )
∫ −
dg0
dxE*
iθ*0 + ix*0
∂xE*
dθ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− ∂
2g0
∂xE* ∂θ
+ d
2g0
dx2
∂xE*
dθ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
di
0
i*0 xE* ,A0( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
  
In the symmetric case, ∂xE
*
∂θ = 0 ; therefore ∂
2 g0
∂xE* ∂θ
= ∂
2 g1
∂xE* ∂θ
= 0 , and we can simplify the above 
to 
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 ∂
2D0
∂p0 ∂θ
=
f xE*( ) dg
0
dxE*
− dg
1
dxE*
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
iθ0
*0
−2t + dg
1
dxE*
di
0
i*1 xE* ,A1( )
∫ − dg
0
dxE*
di
0
i*0 xE* ,A0( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
2   
We signed iθ0
*0  negative in Lemma 1; this means that ∂
2D0
∂p0 ∂θ
 takes the sign of dg
1
dxE*
− dg
0
dxE*
, thus the effect of adjustment on price sensitivity of demand takes this sign. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Using p0* = −F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0 , and noting that symmetry makes 
F xE*( ) f xE*( )  constant in θ : 
 
∂p0*
∂θ
= F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0
2
⋅ ∂
2 xE*
∂ p0 ∂θ
= F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0
2
⋅
dg0
dxE*
− dg
1
dxE*
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
iθ0
*0
−2t + dg
1
dxE*
di
0
i*1 xE* ,A1( )
∫ − dg
0
dxE*
di
0
i*0 xE* ,A0( )
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
2
  
which takes the sign of dg
1
dxE*
− dg
0
dxE*
 . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. Begin with the expression for p0  in Proposition 1, 
p0* = −F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0 . Because ∂xE
*
∂t = 0  in the symmetric case, it follows that 
F xE*( ) f xE*( )  is invariant in t. So, using Lemma 1 and ∂xE*∂t = 0 , 
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(A7) 
∂p0*
∂t = −
F xE*( )
f xE*( )
−2 + ∂2 g1∂xE*2
∂xE*
∂t di
0
i*1 xE* ,A1( )
∫ − ∂
2 g0
∂xE*2
∂xE*
∂t di
0
i*0 xE* ,A0( )
∫
+ ∂g
1
∂xE*
it*1 + ix*1 ∂xE
*
∂t( )− ∂g0∂xE* it*0 + ix*0 ∂xE*∂t( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
=
F xE*( )
f xE*( )
2 − ∂g1∂xE* it
*1 + ∂g
0
∂xE*
it*0( ) = F xE
*( )
f xE*( )
2 − ∂g1∂xE* 1 gi*1
1( ) + ∂g0∂xE* 1 gi*00( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
  
Given Assumption 3, this may be signed positive. The no-adjustment case yields 
∂p0 ∂t = 2F x( ) f x( ) , consistent with Bloch and Manceau (1999). Clearly 
∂p0 ∂t > 2F x( ) f x( )  corresponds to ∂g
0
∂xE*
> 0  and ∂g1∂xE* < 0 , while ∂p0 ∂t < 2F x( ) f x( )  
when ∂g
0
∂xE*
< 0  and ∂g1∂xE* > 0 . 
 Finally, given that (A7) neatly decomposes into a direct effect of product 
differentiation without adjustment and an indirect effect through adjustment, the signing 
relationships given above indicate that t positively mediates the effects of adjustment on 
price. That is, the larger t, the more intense the effects of adjustment on price. 
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